WHAT DOES “INCOMPATIBILITY” MEAN AND WHY IS IT THE REASON FOR A DIVORCE?

What constitutes incompatibility in a divorce action? (Berry v. Berry, 215 Kan. 47)

This case explored the issue of what constitutes ‘incompatibility’ in a divorce action. In exploring this issue, the court concluded that incompatibility exists when the parties are in such deep conflict that it is impossible for them to continue a normal marital relationship.

Appellant (Lavada) and appellee (Floyd) were married with 10 children. Lavada filed a petition for separate maintenance, alleging Floyd was “guilty of extreme cruelty and gross neglect of duty”. Lavada testified that she did not believe in divorce, but Floyd filed a petition for divorce based on the incompatibility ground. At trial, evidence was presented that accused Floyd of a number of things including physical abuse and substance abuse. Evidence was also presented against Lavada that suggested she always argued and was a bad housekeeper. However, the trial court concluded that the evidence was in favor of Floyd and granted the divorce decree, precluding Lavada from a grant of separate maintenance.

Lavada argued that evidence presented was in favor of her request for separate maintenance and that evidence of poor housekeeping does not constitute incompatibility. Lavada presented evidence of physical abuse and even had one of their daughters testify to the physical and substance abuse of the child’s father. The trial court found that both parties proved their case, while Lavada believed that Floyd did not prove his case for a divorce. The trail court concluded that incompatibility is broadly defined as basically not being able to coexist together in peace. The trial court granted divorce in favor of Floyd. Lavada also contended the custody arrangement granted by the trial court that resulted in Floyd having custody of the four youngest children. Lavada appealed.

This court concluded that all of the evidence pointed towards incompatibility. The trial court had an opportunity to hear both sides of the story and used its discretion to come to a fair conclusion. The evidence suggested that the spouses could no longer live together in peace, and a divorce could not have been granted to Lavada since she only petitioned for separate maintenance. Therefore, Lavada’s request for separate maintenance was precluded.

Regarding the custody arrangement, the court concluded that there was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court when determining custody. The trial court is in the best position to determine the interests of the children.

In sum, because incompatibility is so broadly defined, the spouses simply need to be incompatible for this ground to be valid. Not being able to live together in peace is sufficient.

What evidence is sufficient to establish incompatibility? (Larue v. Larue – 216 Kan. 242)

This case examined what evidence is necessary to establish a claim of incompatibility in a divorce action. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that incompatibility is broadly defined and testimony that one party harbors resentment for the other may be enough to establish incompatibility.

The defendant (John Larue) and plaintiff (Nina Larue) were married and lived on a 210-acre farm owned by Nina. Nina inherited the property from her previous husband who had since passed away. One day, John went to the hospital to undergo surgery for an illness he suffered from. Upon his release from the hospital, Nina did not allow John back in the house. Nina eventually filed for divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. Nina stated that the reason she filed for divorce was because John “hadn’t done anything for so long and I got so tired of keeping him and cooking for him…I hated him”. Nina also referred to John as “dumb and lazy” on multiple occasions. The trial court concluded that there was enough evidence of incapability and dissolved the marriage. John appealed ruling.

John argued that there was not enough evidence to support Nina’s claim of incompatibility and that the trial court erred in the ruling. John believed that the trial court did not corroborate Nina’s testimony and abused its discretion when it granted the divorce based on the grounds of incompatibility.

John also argued that the trial court erred in dividing the spouses’ property. The trail court awarded Nina with the 210-acre farm, and awarded John one half of the personal property assets, which turned out to be $10,000. John argued that he contributed to the construction of the farm and barn with a $7,269.46 investment. John argued that the trial court abused its discretion when dividing only the personal property between him and Nina. However, the trial court is granted wide discretion when adjusting financial obligations. Part of John’s argument was that the division of the property was not just and reasonable, but the court said that it is not a requirement for the division to be equal for it to be just and reasonable.

Regarding John’s argument pertaining to incompatibility, this court reasoned that incompatibility as a ground for divorce is intended to broaden the scope of a divorce action. The court explained that the trial judge had the discretion as long as it was exercised in good faith. Either spouse may obtain a divorce upon the uncorroborated account of either spouse. If Nina’s temperament was not compatible with John’s temperament, then it was impossible for John’s temperament to be compatible with Nina’s. Nina was upset with John’s contribution financially and the court concluded that her disputes were deep-rooted and long-standing.

In sum, uncorroborated testimony that speaks to the incompatibility may be enough to establish this ground. In fact, arguing against it proves that there is a presence of incompatibility. Also, division of property does not have to be equal for it to be considered just and reasonable. The trial court is given a lot of discretion.

Can one spouse use a defense against incompatibility in a divorce proceeding that was started based on the grounds of incompatibility? (LaRue v. LaRue, 531 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1975).)

The issue in this case is whether there is a defense to incompatibility when one spouse files a petition for divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. It is inconceivable that Spouse A’s temperament can be compatible with Spouse B’s, if Spouse B’s temperament is incompatible with Spouse A’s.

In this case, the Nina and John were married in 1945. The couple lived together until John became very ill on May 15, 2973. After recovering and being released from the hospital, Nina did not permit John to return to their marital home. On July 6, 1973, Nina sued for a divorce alleging irreconcilable incompatibility. John initially answered the divorce petition with a denial, then filed a cross-petition also alleging irreconcilable incompatibility, eventually abandoning his cross-petition at the trial. At trial, Nina testified about the marital relationship stating that she was “so sick and tired of looking at [John] that [she] hated him.” Throughout her testimony, she continuously referred to John as “that thing over there” and described him as “dumb” and “lazy.” Nina also complained about John’s work ethic, alleging that he did not help her with any of the farm work because he was “too damn lazy.” According to Nina, John also tried to get money from her, including taking money directly from her pocketbook. The trial court found that the parties were incompatible. John appealed the trial court’s decision alleging that the trial court’s decision was unsupported by the evidence.

It is inconceivable that Spouse A’s temperament can be compatible with Spouse B’s, if Spouse B’s temperament is incompatible with Spouse A’s. Incompatibility may be broadly defined as such a deep and irreconcilable conflict in personalities or temperaments of the parties as makes it impossible for them to continue a normal marital relationship. The court found that throughout Nina’s testimony, her hostility and resentment towards John were evident. The court was not compelled by John’s argument that Nina’s testimony alone was not enough to establish incompatibility, and her testimony need be corroborated. However, in Kansas, a party may obtain a divorce upon the uncorroborated testimony of either or both of the parties. The trial court found that Nina was not compatible with John given her attitude towards him. Therefore, the court held it was not possible that John could be compatible with Nina since Nina was so incompatible with John.

The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish the parties’ incompatibility. The mere fact that Nina claimed the parties were incompatible and John denied that fact showed the parties were incompatible. The Supreme Court of Kansas was also persuaded by the finding of the trial court that Nina harbored nothing but hostility and resentment towards John, establishing that she was not compatible with him – therefore, John could not possibly be compatible with Nina.

IF IT’S BOTH PARTIES “FAULT” THE MARRIAGE DIDN’T WORK IS THAT A DEFENSE TO A DIVORCE CASE? (Cohee v. Cohee, 26 Kan Ap 2d 756

This case explored the issue of whether mutuality of fault is a defense to a petition for divorce on the grounds of failure to perform a marital duty. That is, can one party’s fault be raised as a defense to the other party’s fault? The court ultimately concluded that in a divorce action, fault should not be considered in determining division of property or spousal maintenance.

Patricia Cohee (appellee) filed a petition against her husband, Terry Cohee (appellant), alleging incompatibility and requested separate maintenance. Terry filed a counter petition requesting an absolute divorce based on a failure to perform a material marital duty. The district court denied Terry’s counter petition. The district court also awarded maintenance and divided marital assets. The district court reasoned that the parties were mutually involved in disputes that resulted in violence. Due to the mutuality of the violence the court denied Terry’s counter-petition for divorce. Terry appealed the district court’s decision.

Terry argued that the trial court erred in concluding that an absolute divorce does not have to be granted regardless of evidence establishing the proper grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed this holding and held that Patricia and Terry were to be granted an absolute divorce because there was evidence presented that supported a failure to perform a marital duty.

Terry also argued that the trial court erred in not considering fault when making its rulings regarding property division and spousal support. The Court of Appeals stated that the court does not have to consider fault when considering a division of property and an award for spousal support. The court found that considering fault would serve “no end but an impermissible of punishing a person’s marital misconduct.”

In sum, fault is not considered in determining division of property or maintenance. In addition, mutuality of fault is not a defense to a petition for divorce.